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Abstract
Ethical vegetarians maintain that vegetarianism
is morally required. The principal reasons offered
in support of ethical vegetarianism are (i) concern
for the welfare and well-being of the animals
being eaten, (ii) concern for the environment,
(iii) concern over global food scarcity and the
just distribution of resources, and (iv) concern
for future generations. Each of these reasons is
explored in turn, starting with a historical look at
ethical vegetarianism and the moral status of
animals.
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Introduction
Vegetarians refrain from eating animals. Ethical
vegetarians refrain from eating animals for moral
reasons. This entry explores both the
non-anthropocentric and anthropocentric moral
reasons for vegetarianism. The principal
non-anthropocentric reason for ethical vegetari-
anism is direct moral concern for the welfare and
well-being of the animals being eaten. The prin-
cipal anthropocentric reasons for vegetarianism
are (i) concern for the environment, (ii) concern
over global food scarcity and the just distribution
of resources, and (iii) concern for future genera-
tions. The entry begins with a brief historical look
at ethical vegetarianism and the moral status of
animals.
Ethical Vegetarianism: A Historical
Overview
Ethical vegetarianism has a rich history dating
back more than 2,500 years. Pythagoras
(ca. 570–490 BCE) is one of the earliest known
andmost prominent proponents of vegetarianism.
From what we know of his teachings as spelled
out by Ovid, Pythagoras offered at least four
moral reasons for refraining from eating meat.
First, he maintained that eating meat requires
the unnecessary killing of animals, since nature
provides bountiful plant-based alternatives that
“require no bloodshed and no slaughter”
(Walters and Portmess 1999, p. 16). Second, he
insisted that killing animals dehumanizes
humans: “Oh, what a wicked thing it is for flesh
to be the tomb of flesh, . . . Must you destroy
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another to satiate your greedy-gutted cravings?”
(Walters and Portmess 1999, p. 17). Third, he
thought it wrong to kill animals for food, because
they have done nothing to deserve it (Walters and
Portmess 1999, pp. 17–18). Finally, because he
believed that human souls transmigrate into
nonhuman animals, Pythagoras condemned eating
meat on the grounds that doing so might involve
the murder of kindred souls: “So I warn you, lest
appetite murder brotherhood, I warn you by all the
priesthood inme, do not exilewhatmay be kindred
souls by evil slaughter. Blood should not nourish
blood” (Walters and Portmess 1999, p. 19).
Plutarch of Chaeronea (ca. 56–120 CE) argued
that humans are not naturally carnivorous
(Walters and Portmess 1999, p. 29). He also
argued that animals are intrinsically valuable
and deserve moral consideration in their own
right because they are sentient, intelligent crea-
tures and, thus, should not be killed and eaten
(Walters and Portmess 1999, p. 32). Porphyry
(ca. 232–304 CE) held that justice requires that
we do no harm to any being capable of being
harmed, and since animals can be harmed, the
do no harm principle must be extended to every
animated being (Walters and Portmess 1999,
pp. 44–45).
Aristotle (384–322 BCE) had quite a different
view of our moral relationship with animals. He
maintained that every being that exists has a telos,
i.e., an ultimate purpose for existing. Aristotle
held that the purpose of the superior is to rule
over the inferior and the purpose of the inferior
is to serve the superior. He also held that the
rational is superior to the irrational. Because he
regarded animals as inferior irrational beings,
Aristotle concluded that the purpose of animals
is to serve the needs of rational man: tame animals
serve as food and as beasts of burden, and wild
animals serve as food and provide clothing and
instruments (Regan and Singer 1989, pp. 6–7).
Aquinas (1225–1274) echoed Aristotle in
insisting that rationality is what makes a being
worthy of moral consideration and respect. He
maintained that only rational creatures are free
and autonomous, and only free and autonomous
creatures have intrinsic value, i.e., value in and of
themselves. Animals, being irrational creatures,
have only instrumental value, i.e., they have
value only to the extent that they are of use for
rational creatures. Kant (1724–1804), too,
followed Aristotle in embracing the rationality
criterion of moral considerability. For Kant, ani-
mals are not rational members of the kingdom of
ends, and so, the categorical imperative does not
apply to them. Like Aquinas, Kant concluded that
animals only have instrumental value; they are
not ends in themselves but rather, mere means to
an end – that end being man.
Descartes (1596–1650) took linguistic ability
to be the mark of mentality. Because he held that
all nonhuman animals are incapable of using
language, Descartes concluded that all nonhuman
animals are mindless machines – mere automata
devoid of thought and reason.When coupled with
the rationality criterion of moral considerability,
the Cartesian view of animals implies that ani-
mals are bereft of morally significant interests.
Historically, Aristotelianism and Cartesianism
helped shape Western attitudes regarding the
treatment of animals, including killing them for
food, for if animals are devoid of morally signif-
icant interests, then killing them and eating them
does not violate their interests.
But not all modern philosophers were per-
suaded by the Aristotelian/Cartesian view of ani-
mals. Voltaire (1694–1778) appealed to
neurophysiological evidence to challenge
Descartes’s claim that linguistic ability provides
the only compelling evidence of mentality: “has
nature arranged all the means of feeling in this
animal, so that it may not feel? Has it nerves in
order to be impassible? Do not suppose this
impertinent contradiction in nature” (Regan and
Singer 1989, p. 21). Voltaire also argued that
animal behavior – such as nervous pacing or
jumping for joy – often provides us with excellent
evidence of an animal’s current mental states.
David Hume (1711–1776) also rejected Carte-
sianism with respect to animals. He insisted that
no truth is more evident than that animals are
endowed with thought and reason. Hume also
thought it obvious that animals are not only capa-
ble of experiencing pain and pleasure but also
capable of experiencing fear, anger, courage,
and other emotions.
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Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) argued that ani-
mals deserve direct moral consideration. He
rejected the rationality criterion of moral
considerability, insisting that when it comes to
the moral status of animals, the relevant question
“is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but,
Can they suffer?” (Regan and Singer 1989, p. 26).
Like Bentham, Henry Salt (1851–1939) also
thought that the capacity to suffer is what makes
a being worthy of moral consideration. Because
animals are capable of suffering, Salt thought it
morally unjustifiable to cause them unnecessary
pain. He also thought it wrong to kill animals
unnecessarily. Since we can meet all of our nutri-
tional needs with a vegetarian diet, Salt argued
that it is wrong “to breed and kill animals for
merely culinary purposes” (1886, p. 10).
Many of these historical themes repeat them-
selves in the contemporary debate over ethical
vegetarianism: What property or feature makes
a being worthy of moral consideration? Which
beings deserve moral consideration, and how
much consideration are they owed? Are we justi-
fied in killing animals for food, when equally
nutritious plant-based foods are readily avail-
able? Contemporary answers to these questions
are addressed in what follows.
Setting the Stage for the Contemporary
Debate
Three factors play a critical role in the contem-
porary case for ethical vegetarianism. The first
concerns sentience, i.e., the capacity to suffer
and/or experience pleasure or happiness. There
is growing scientific and philosophical consensus
that many animals – certainly all vertebrates – are
conscious, sentient creatures that can feel pain
and can suffer. The evidence for animal sentience
parallels the evidence we have for thinking our
fellow humans are capable of feeling pain:
• Animals manifest pain behavior, not just
reflex actions to noxious stimuli (protective
pain) but subsequent pain-induced behavioral
modification caused by bodily damage
(restorative pain).
• We observe significant anatomical and neuro-
physiological similarity between humans and
many animals (including all mammals and
most vertebrates).
• Efferent and afferent nerves run throughout
their bodies, including myelinated A-delta
fibers (the kind of fibers responsible for acute
“protective pain” in humans) and unmyelin-
ated C fibers (the kind of fibers responsible for
“restorative pain” in humans).
• Endogenous serotonergic and opioid pain-
control mechanisms are present in mammals,
birds, and fish. [Why would organisms inca-
pable of feeling pain have endogenous pain-
control systems?]
• Analgesics and anesthetics cause animals to
stop exhibiting pain behavior, presumably
because these substances prevent the pain
itself in much the way they prevent pain in
humans.
• There is compelling experimental evidence
that the capacity to feel pain enhances survival
value in animals, based on the self-destructive
tendencies displayed by animals that have
been surgically deafferented.
In short, there is overwhelming evidence that
mammals, birds, and fish can feel morally
significant pain.
Second, despite the scientific, philosophical,
and commonsense awareness that animals are
conscious, sentient beings in their own right,
farmed animals are regarded as commodities
and are treated as if they were mere “production
units” devoid of morally significant interests. The
process of converting conscious, sentient animals
into meat begins by forcibly impregnating female
cows, pigs, chickens, turkeys, ducks, emus, and
sheep. The resulting offspring are then typically
housed intensively in inhospitable, massively
overcrowded warehouses or sheds for the dura-
tion of their lives. For example, chickens are
warehoused in sheds containing up to 100,000
birds, where each bird is only allotted seven-
tenths of a square foot of floor space. Since the
animals cannot move about freely in these
overcrowded conditions, they are forced to
stand in their waste. The noxious ammonia
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fumes from the urine cause chronic lung and eye
irritation. In these unnatural conditions, the ani-
mals are prevented from satisfying even their
most basic instinctual urges (e.g., to nurse,
stretch, move around, root, groom, build nests,
rut, establish social orders, select mates, etc.),
which causes severe stress in the animals. The
stress, in turn, increases aggression. To prevent
losses from aggression, the animals receive pre-
emptive mutilations. For example, to prevent
chickens and turkeys from pecking each other to
death, the birds are “debeaked” using a scalding
hot blade that slices through the highly sensitive
horn of the beak. Other routine mutilations
include toe removal, tail docking, branding,
dehorning, ear tagging, ear clipping, teeth
pulling, and castration – all performed without
anesthesia. Unanesthetized branding, dehorning,
ear tagging, ear clipping, and castration are stan-
dard procedures on small-scale family farms, as
well. The final stage in the “meat production”
process is slaughter. Some animals meet with
on-site slaughter, but most are shipped to slaugh-
terhouses without food or water and without ade-
quate protection from the elements. At the
slaughterhouse, the animals are hung upside
down and are brought via conveyor to the slaugh-
terer who slits their throats. In many cases (and all
“ritual kill” cases), the animals are fully con-
scious throughout the entire ordeal (Engel 2000,
pp. 861–865). Worldwide, over 60 billion land
animals are slaughtered for food each year. No
other human activity results in more pain, suffer-
ing, frustration, and premature death than animal
agriculture.
Third, there is no nutritional need to eat meat.
This fact should be obvious from the number of
vegetarians worldwide. According to some esti-
mates, there are 375 million vegetarians world-
wide. According to other estimates, there are
400–500 million vegetarians in India alone.
Even with the lowest estimates, there are hun-
dreds of millions of perfectly healthy vegetarians
worldwide. There is also scientific consensus on
the healthfulness of meat-free vegetarian diets. In
their joint position paper on vegetarian diets, the
American Dietetic Association and the Dietitians
of Canada maintain that appropriately planned
vegetarian diets are “healthful, nutritionally ade-
quate, and provide health benefits in the preven-
tion and treatment of certain diseases” and are
“appropriate for all stages of the life cycle,
including during pregnancy, lactation, infancy,
childhood, and adolescence” (Mangels
et al. 2003, p. 748). The health benefits of vege-
tarian diets are also highlighted in USDA’s Die-
tary Guidelines for Americans, 2010: “In
prospective studies of adults, compared to
non-vegetarian eating patterns, vegetarian-style
eating patterns have been associated with
improved health outcomes – lower levels of obe-
sity, a reduced risk of cardiovascular disease, and
lower total mortality.” It is easy to eat a well-
balanced, nutritionally complete vegetarian diet.
No special food combining is necessary. All one
needs to do is eat sufficient calories centered
around the following four food groups: whole
grains (5+ servings/day), vegetables (3+ serv-
ings/day), fruits (3+ servings/day), and legumes
(2+ servings/day). Anyone who eats the
recommended daily servings of these four food
groups will be eating a nutritionally sound plant-
based diet (though vegans, who consume 100 %
plant-based diets, should include a reliable source
of B12 in their diets). Far from being risky, such a
diet reduces one’s risk of heart disease, cancer,
stroke, hypertension, obesity, and diabetes
(Mangels et al. 2003, p. 748).
Ethical Vegetarianism
and Consideration for Animals
The question at the heart of the ethical debate
over vegetarianism is this: Are we justified in
raising and killing animals for food, when equally
nutritious plant-based food is readily available?
Ethical vegetarians argue that the answer to this
question is “no.” This section will explore three
such arguments: (i) the utilitarian argument,
(ii) the deontological rights-based argument,
and (iii) the argument from moral consistency.
The next section “Ethical Vegetarianism, Envi-
ronmental Sustainability, and Global Justice”
will explore three interrelated anthropocentric
reasons for ethical vegetarianism.
4 Vegetarianism
The Utilitarian Argument for Ethical
Vegetarianism
Peter Singer (1975, 2011) defends ethical vege-
tarianism on preference utilitarian grounds. Prop-
erly understood, preference utilitarianism
combines a principle of equality with a principle
of utility maximization. The principle of equality
requires us to give equal consideration to the
interests of every being having interests, regard-
less of race, gender, or species. The utility max-
imization principle requires us to act in ways that
maximize the satisfaction of interests of all those
affected by our behavior.
Singer argues that sentience is both necessary
and sufficient for possessing interests. It would be
nonsense to say that a rock has an interest in not
being kicked down the street. Rocks lack interests
because they cannot suffer or experience pleasure.
However, a cat does have an interest in not being
kicked down the street, because she would suffer if
kicked down the street. Since any sentient being
has an interest in avoiding suffering, sentience is
sufficient for possessing interests. Consequently,
the principle of equality must be understood as
applying to all sentient beings: we must give
equal weight to the like interests of all sentient
beings when carrying out our utilitarian calcula-
tions. Giving animals equal consideration does not
imply that we must treat all animals alike, but it
does require that we give their pleasures and pains
equalweightwith human pleasures and painswhen
carrying out our utilitarian calculations. Failure to
deliberate in thisway is speciesism, a baseless form
of discrimination akin to racism and sexism.
Since the principle of equality requires us to
factor animals’ interests into our utilitarian calcu-
lations in an impartial way, a compelling utilitar-
ian case can be made for ethical vegetarianism.
According to preference utilitarianism, an action
is right for a person just in case, out of all the
actions available to that person, that action max-
imizes the satisfaction of interests of all those
affected by the action (i.e., just in case no other
action produces more net interest satisfaction).
We know that meat production, by its very nature,
involves harming animals, causing them to suffer,
and killing them prematurely. Since animals’
interests are affected by our dietary choices, we
must factor their suffering into our utilitarian cal-
culations. Is all of the pain that farmed animals
suffer outweighed by some greater gain that could
not be achieved in any other way? Eating meat is
not necessary for survival or good health. What
about pleasure? People do enjoy the taste of meat
and get pleasure from eating it. Does human gus-
tatory pleasure justify raising and killing animals
for food? Singer offers three compelling reasons
to think not. First, on any candid appraisal, it is
extremely doubtful that the fleeting pleasure
humans get from eating meat outweighs all of
the pain, suffering, and misery farmed animals
experience in the process of becoming that meat.
Second, in rearing and killing animals for food,
we are sacrificing their most significant interests
(i.e., their interests in avoiding pain, in moving
about freely, in living lives appropriate to their
kind, etc.) in order to satisfy trivial interests of our
own (i.e., our desire for particular taste sensa-
tions), and the principle of equality requires that
we give significant interests greater weight than
trivial ones. Third, were we to grant, for the sake
of argument, that the gustatory pleasure people
get from eating meat does outweigh the pain,
suffering, and misery farmed animals endure in
becoming that meat, it still wouldn’t follow on
utilitarian grounds that eating meat is permissible;
for utilitarianism requires us to consider all avail-
able actions, and one action available to us at
mealtimes is to eat a cruelty-free meatless meal
that we enjoy just as much. Since eating delicious
plant-based foods can satisfy our interest in
“tasty” nutritious meals without requiring farmed
animals to suffer, utilitarianism entails that vege-
tarianism is morally required.
The Rights-Based Argument for Ethical
Vegetarianism
Tom Regan (1983) argues that animals have
moral rights and that raising and killing them
for food violates their rights. He begins his
defense of animal rights by arguing that the rights
view provides a better account of our moral duties
to our fellow humans than other prominent
approaches to ethics. Regan rejects utilitarianism
on the grounds that it sanctions sacrificing indi-
viduals for trivial gains in utility. He rejects
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contractarianism since it entails that we have no
direct duties to those cognitively impaired
humans who are incapable of understanding the
social contract. Unlike these other views, the
rights view maintains that all human beings are
equally valuable in and of themselves. Because
all humans are equally inherently valuable,
Regan argues, they have an equal moral right to
be treated in ways that respect their value.
Why are all humans equally inherently valu-
able? Regan’s answer is that they are all
experiencing subjects of a life – i.e., conscious
beings with experiential welfares that matter to
them. Since human infants, senile humans, and
mentally deficient humans are equally experienc-
ing subjects of a life, they have equal inherent
value and the same right to respectful treatment
as all other human beings.
Regan next observes that humans aren’t the
only animals who are subjects of a life. Since
many nonhuman animals are also subjects of a
life, Regan concludes that they too have equal
inherent value and the same right to respectful
treatment as humans – they cannot be used as a
mere means to our ends. When we raise and kill
animals for food, we treat inherently valuable
beings in ways that reduce them to the status of
“things.” In doing so, we fail to respect their
inherent value, we violate their rights, and we
act immorally, as a result. Because animal agri-
culture systematically violates the rights of ani-
mals, the rights view calls for the total dissolution
of animal agriculture.
Regan argues that vegetarianism is morally
obligatory. But how, exactly, does one move
from the wrongness of animal agriculture to the
wrongness of eating meat? After all, a dead piece
of meat in the grocery store is not a subject of a
life and thus does not have rights. So, why is
purchasing and eating that meat wrong on the
rights view? According to the rights view, it is
categorically wrong to purchase the products of
an unjust industry. Any practice or institution that
systematically violates rights by treating inher-
ently valuable beings as mere things to be con-
sumed is inherently unjust. Because the meat
industry systematically violates the rights of
farmed animals by treating them as mere things
to be killed for food and profit, the meat industry
is an inherently unjust institution. Since it is cat-
egorically wrong to purchase the products of an
unjust industry, it is categorically wrong to pur-
chase and consume meat. Consequently, vegetar-
ianism is morally required.
Objections to Singer’s and Regan’s Defenses
of Vegetarianism
Both Singer and Regan predicate their arguments
for ethical vegetarianism on the equal
considerability premise:
(EC) Animals deserve exactly the same degree of
moral consideration as that owed humans
and/or have rights equal in strength to the
rights of humans.
Critics typically respond to Singer’s and
Regan’s arguments by dismissing the underlying
normative theories (i.e., utilitarianism and the
rights view, respectively) on which their argu-
ments are based and by rejecting the equal
considerability premise. For example, Carl
Cohen (2001) rejects Regan’s rights view and,
by implication, (EC). Cohen insists that all and
only those beings with the capacity for moral
autonomy have rights (2001, p. 36). Because
humans have this capacity, they have rights.
Because animals lack the capacity for moral
autonomy, they lack rights, and if they lack rights,
they ipso facto lack rights equal in strength to the
rights of humans. If animals lack rights, as Cohen
insists, then killing them for food obviously does
not violate their rights. Regan and others have
responded to Cohen’s criticism by noting that
many humans lack the capacity for free moral
judgment, and yet, we still think these humans
have moral rights equal in strength to the rights
of autonomous humans. If our pre-theoretical
intuition that nonautonomous humans have
moral rights is correct, then contra Cohen, the
capacity for moral autonomy is not a necessary
condition for possessing moral rights.
Peter Carruthers takes a similar tack when
criticizing Singer’s utilitarian argument for veg-
etarianism. He finds both utilitarianism and the
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equal considerability premise underlying it to be
unacceptable. As for utilitarianism, he asks us to
imagine stumbling upon a burning building
containing 100 healthy dogs in cages and 1 old
friendless man. We only have time either to flip
the electronic switch that frees all the dogs from
their cages simultaneously or to pull out the old
man, but not both. Suppose, moreover, we know
saving the dogs would maximize interest satis-
faction. In such a situation, utilitarianism requires
us to save the dogs rather than the old man.
Carruthers finds this result “morally outrageous”
(1992, pp. 95–96).
Carruthers finds (EC) equally unacceptable.
He takes (EC) to imply that killing an animal is
just as morally serious as killing a human.
Accepting that implication would force us to
regard practices, like animal agriculture, which
involve the regular slaughter of animals, as being
as moral reprehensible as the Nazi holocaust, in
which case any form of opposition, no matter
how violent, e.g., bombing farmers’ homes,
would be fully justified (Carruthers 1992, p. 96).
Carruthers finds these implications “morally
abhorrent” (1992, p. 96).
It is not clear how effective or how fair
Carruthers’s criticisms are. First, Singer denies
that the equal considerability premise entails that
all lives are equally valuable. He argues at length
that the killing of a person (i.e., a self-aware,
autonomous individual with a sense of the future)
is more seriously wrong than the killing of a
merely sentient animal. Singer is not endorsing a
form of speciesism here, for not all humans are
persons and some nonhumans (e.g., chimpanzees,
bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans) are persons, on
his view. So, Singer’s view does not imply that
factory farming is themoral equivalent of theNazi
holocaust, though other authors, quite indepen-
dent of Singer, have made such comparisons.
Regarding Carruthers’s charge that utilitarian-
ism’s commitment to (EC) justifies using vio-
lence to bring an end to animal exploitation, it is
highly unlikely that perpetrating violence on
farmers would be an effective means of reducing
farmed animal suffering, and if, as is likely, it
failed to reduce animal suffering, then such vio-
lence would only serve to increase the total
amount of suffering in the world (because of the
additional human suffering it produced), which is
antithetical to utilitarianism.
There are, then, compelling reasons to think
that both Cohen’s and Carruthers’s criticisms
miss their marks. Even so, many people intui-
tively side with Cohen and Carruthers in their
rejection of (EC). For present purposes, we can
sidestep the question of whether or not (EC) is
true, because many arguments for ethical vege-
tarianism do not presuppose (EC). The next sec-
tion will explore such an argument.
Ethical Vegetarianism and Moral Consistency
A number of philosophers (Curnutt 1997; Engel
2000, 2001; DeGrazia 2009) have sought to
reduce the argument for ethical vegetarianism to
its simplest form. Starting with three common-
sense moral principles that we all accept, these
philosophers force us to examine the logical and
practical implications of our own beliefs. The
principles are:
(P1) It is wrong to harm, or support practices that
harm, sentient animals unnecessarily.
(P2) It is wrong to cause, or support practices that
cause, sentient animals to suffer
unnecessarily.
(P3) It is wrong to kill, or support practices that
kill, sentient animals unnecessarily.
These principles are not in dispute. Even the
staunchest defenders of animal use embrace these
commonsense principles. For example, Cohen
explicitly endorses (P2) and (P3): “we, as moral
agents, have a general obligation to avoid impos-
ing needless pain or death” (2001, p. 226).
Carruthers also endorses (P2): “Most people
hold that it is wrong to cause animals unnecessary
suffering. . .. all will agree that gratuitous
suffering – suffering caused for no good
reason – is wrong” (1992, p. 8). Principles
(P1)–(P3) are so central to our conception of
morality that any moral theory that conflicted
with them would be rejected as unsatisfactory
on reflective equilibrium grounds. Since any ade-
quate moral view must cohere with these
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principles, we can appeal to these principles
directly when defending ethical vegetarianism.
In the section “Ethical Vegetarianism:
A Historical Overview,” we observed three
things:
(I) Mammals, birds, and fish are sentient
beings that can experience morally
significant pain.
(II) There is no way to raise animals for food
without harming and killing those animals.
Meat production inherently involves
harming animals, causing them to suffer,
and killing them.
(III) There is no nutritional need to eat meat.
Given III, all of the harm, suffering, and pre-
mature death inflicted on farmed animals is
unnecessary. It serves no vital human need.
Given I, II, and III, it follows that when one
purchases meat, one is supporting a practice
(viz., animal agriculture) that harms sentient ani-
mals, causes them to suffer, and kills them unnec-
essarily. Since it is wrong to cause, or support
practices that cause, sentient animals unneces-
sary harm, unnecessary suffering, and/or unnec-
essary premature death, (P1)–(P3) entail that it is
wrong to purchase and consume meat (whenever
plant-based food is available, which in modern
societies is almost always). Consequently, those
of us who accept (P1)–(P3) are rationally com-
mitted to the immorality of eating meat, on pain
of inconsistency. Thus, our very own beliefs
entail that vegetarianism is morally required
(Engel 2000, 2001).
Non-anthropocentric concern for animals isn’t
the only reason for thinking that vegetarianism is
morally required. There are also compelling
anthropocentric reasons for thinking vegetarian-
ism obligatory. The next section examines three
such reasons.
Ethical Vegetarianism, Environmental
Sustainability, and Global Justice
In her groundbreaking book Diet for a Small
Planet (1971), Francis Moore Lappé defended
vegetarianism by demonstrating the nutritional
adequacy of vegetarian diets and by highlighting
both the negative impact meat production has on
the environment and the role animal agriculture
plays in global food scarcity. Lappé’s reasons for
vegetarianism remain as salient today as they
were in 1971. The present section explores three
interrelated reasons for thinking that vegetarian-
ism is morally required: (i) environmental sus-
tainability, (ii) concern over global food scarcity
and the just distribution of resources, and (iii)
concern for future generations.
Animal Agriculture and the Environment
Animal agriculture is an extremely resource-
intensive, environmentally degrading, highly
inefficient means of food production. This sub-
section will focus on animal agriculture’s contri-
bution to water shortage, water pollution,
deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and soil ero-
sion. Subsequent subsections will focus on ani-
mal agriculture’s waste of nutrients, its impact on
climate change, and its impact on humans.
Water Usage
Meat production consumes vastly more water
(per kg and per kcal) than grain and root vegeta-
ble production. When measured by weight, meat
production requires 100–200 times more water
per kg produced than grain and vegetable produc-
tion. For example, it takes 500 liters of water to
grow 1 kg of potatoes and 900 liters of water to
grow 1 kg of wheat, but it requires 100,000 liters
of water to produce 1 kg of beef (Engel 2000,
p. 871). Even when measured by calorie, beef
production requires 20 times more water per
kcal produced than grain and root vegetable pro-
duction. Either way you measure it, animal agri-
culture is extremely inefficient in its water usage,
compared to grain and vegetable production. If
there were unlimited supplies of fresh water, such
water inefficiency might not be a problem, but
supplies of fresh water are, indeed, limited.
According to the UN, water scarcity already
affects every continent on the planet, with 1.2
billion people currently living in areas of physical
scarcity. Against this backdrop, it is imperative
that humans take effective steps to reduce their
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water footprint. In light of animal agriculture’s
water inefficiency, switching from a meat-based
diet to a vegetarian diet is one of the most signif-
icant steps one can take to reduce one’s water
footprint. Skipping one shower a week reduces
one’s water footprint by 60 gal per week. Skip-
ping one quarter-pound hamburger reduces one’s
water footprint by 6,000 gal. For someone
currently eating a quarter pound of beef per day,
switching to a vegetarian diet would
reduce his/her water footprint by 42,000 gal
(i.e., 175,000 liters) per week.
Water Pollution
Animal agriculture is one of the leading causes of
surface-water and groundwater pollution. Rais-
ing animals for food generates an enormous
amount of hazardous waste in the form of excre-
ment. In the USA, for example, livestock produce
250,000 lb of excrement per second, resulting in
one billion tons of unrecycled waste per year
(Engel 2000, p. 872). This waste contains patho-
gens (including viruses and antibiotic-resistant
bacteria), heavy metals, hormones, antibiotics,
ammonia, and high levels of nitrogen and phos-
phorous, which make their way into rivers, lakes,
coastal waters, and groundwater as a result of
rainfall and irrigation runoff. The excess nitrogen
and phosphorous cause river eutrophication (i.e.,
excess plant growth that causes fish to die from
lack of oxygen) and coastal “dead zones.” The
other pollutants can contaminate drinking water
supplies, rendering them unfit for human con-
sumption. A 1995 General Accounting Office
Report to the US Senate Committee on Agricul-
ture, Nutrition, and Forestry found that animal
waste runoff was responsible for impairing
72 % of rivers and streams, 56 % of lake acres,
and 43 % of estuary miles (Engel 2000, p. 872).
Deforestation, Loss of Biodiversity, and Soil
Erosion
Animal agriculture is also the primary driver of
deforestation in South America, as rainforests are
being clear-cut at a rate of 80,000 acres per day to
make room for new pastureland and/or for new
fields in which to plant feed crops. When
rainforests are replaced by monocultures, the
indigenous animals and plants that depend on
that rainforest ecosystem for nutrients and shelter
are driven to extinction through loss of habitat.
We are now losing an estimated 50,000 species
each year, due to habitat loss and degradation, a
rate of extinction 50–500 times greater than the
background rate reflected in the fossil record.
Ever increasing meat production is the driving
force behind this loss of biodiversity.
We are also losing topsoil at an alarming
rate – another negative by-product of the live-
stock industry. Much of arable land around the
world is devoted to feed crop production. In the
USA, for example, 80 % of the corn and 95 % of
the oats grown are fed to livestock. The excessive
cultivation needed to produce these crops is
responsible for the loss of seven billion tons of
topsoil in the USA each year. Nearly one third of
the world’s arable land has been lost as a result of
soil erosion. Currently, the USA is losing topsoil
at a rate 13 times faster than the rate of soil
formation (Engel 2000, pp. 871–872). Since top-
soil is necessary for growing crops for direct
human consumption, continued loss of topsoil
threatens the survival of our species.
Nutrient Inefficiency, Global Hunger,
and the Just Distribution of Resources
Each year farmers grow more than enough grain
and beans to adequately nourish every human
being on the planet, and yet, currently, one out
of every nine humans on the planet is suffering
from undernutrition, a form of malnutrition
resulting from insufficient calories and/or lack
of essential nutrients. Building on Lappé’s
insights, the present section explains the role
animal agriculture plays in generating global
food scarcity.
Global Hunger and Starvation
Undernutrition due to lack of sufficient nutrients
and calories causes stunting of growth and
wasting of bodily tissues and sometimes causes
premature death. Worldwide, 795 million people
are currently undernourished. In 2011, 165million
children globally experienced stunting and 52mil-
lion children experienced wasting as a result of
undernutrition. That same year, 3.1 million
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children under the age of five died due to under-
nutrition. While hundreds of millions of humans
around the world are suffering from undernutri-
tion and its attendant diseases, no cows on feedlots
are undernourished. Instead, they are being fat-
tened on nutrient-rich grains and legumes (viz.,
corn and soybeans). Those same grains and
legumes could be used to adequately nourish all
of the nearly 800 million humans suffering from
undernutrition, but instead they are fed to cows
and steers so that people in affluent nations can eat
beef. Since it takes 13 lb of grain to produce one
pound of beef, the process of raising grain-fed
cattle for food results in a significant net loss of
food, calories, and macronutrients.
Nutrient Inefficiency
By cycling grain through livestock to produce
animal protein, we lose 90 % of that grain’s
protein, 100 % of its carbohydrates, and 100 %
of its fiber. We also lose 90 % of its caloric
energy. A brief examination of the trophic pyra-
mid explains why so much energy is lost by
cycling grain through livestock. Green plants
are autotrophs (literally, “self-nourishers”),
because they convert solar energy and inorganic
matter into energy-rich organic molecules via
photosynthesis. In contrast, animals are hetero-
trophs (literally, “nourished from others”),
because they must obtain their energy and most
of their nutrients by eating other organisms.
Autotrophs are the primary producers of food
energy and comprise the first trophic level of
every food chain. As autotrophs are consumed,
their energy is transferred to heterotrophic con-
sumers up the food chain. At the second trophic
level are primary consumers – herbivores that
consume plants directly. The third trophic level
consists of secondary consumers – carnivores
that eat herbivores. Because herbivores and car-
nivores are more active than plants, they expend a
significant amount of their assimilated energy on
bodily maintenance, making that energy
unavailable to the next trophic level. “Trophic
efficiency” refers to the percentage of energy
that is transferred from one trophic level to the
next. Since terrestrial habitats have a mean tro-
phic efficiency of 10 %, 90 % of the plant energy
consumed by livestock does not get transferred to
the humans who consume those animals. Were
humans simply to consume plants directly, there
would be 90 % more food energy available for
assimilation by humans – more than enough to
completely nourish every human on the planet.
Just Distribution of Resources
If we were living in a world where every human
enjoyed an overabundance of food and where all
humans for the foreseeable future would also
enjoy an overabundance of food, then employing
highly inefficient systems of food production
would not be unjust (at least where humans are
concerned). But we don’t live in such a world. We
live in a world with significant global food scar-
city, where that very scarcity is the result of the
inefficiencies inherent in meat production. When
we cycle grains and legumes through livestock to
produce animal protein, we are, in effect, squan-
dering food that could adequately nourish all of
the world’s undernourished people. Squandering
food in a time of food scarcity strikes many as
unjust, especially when one considers why so
much food is squandered. We squander food to
meet the taste preferences of affluent people.
Affluent people don’t need meat to survive or
flourish; they just desire meat for its flavor. The
hundreds of millions of undernourished humans,
however, do need adequate amounts of beans and
grains just to survive. Utilitarian, Kantian, and
Rawlsian theories of justice all agree that survival
needs trump trivial desires. It is simply unjust to
let people starve to death so that affluent people
can experience trivial and fleeting taste sensations.
Climate Change and Future Human
Generations
There is scientific consensus that the world is
warming. The past three decades have been the
warmest on record going back to 1850, and each
of the last three decades has been warmer than the
preceding decade. Based on observed increases
in global average air and ocean temperatures,
widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising
global average sea level, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] has concluded
that the warming of the climate system is
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unequivocal. The FAO judges it to be firmly
established that anthropogenic (human-
generated) climate change is occurring, and the
IPCC has very high confidence that human
activities – in particular, those activities resulting
in greenhouse gas emissions – are the dominant
cause of warming since 1950.
The principal anthropogenic greenhouse gas-
ses are carbon dioxide [CO2], nitrous oxide
[N2O], and methane [CH4]. According to the
IPCC, global atmospheric CO2 concentrations
have increased from a preindustrial value of
280 ppm to a value of 391 ppm in 2011 – an
increase of 40 %. Atmospheric concentrations
of nitrous oxide (which has a global warming
potential 296 times greater than CO2) are 20 %
up from 270 ppb to 342 ppb. And atmospheric
concentrations of methane have increased 150 %
from preindustrial concentrations of 722 ppb to
1803 ppb in 2011. As these gasses concentrate in
the atmosphere, they prevent infrared radiation
being emitted from the Earth’s surface from
escaping into space. By trapping the heat that
would have otherwise escaped into space, these
greenhouse gasses result in positive radiative
forcing, the net effect of which is an increase in
global mean air temperature at the Earth’s sur-
face. A rise in temperature of 3.3 !C by 2080
would put stress on the water resources of
2.5–3.2 billion people and would expose 29 mil-
lion people to coastal flooding (Singer 2011,
p. 217). The only way to slow the rate of warming
and thereby reduce the harm future humans will
experience from such warming is for humans
collectively to significantly reduce their contri-
butions to greenhouse gas emissions.
The amount of greenhouses gasses an individ-
ual is personally responsible for contributing to
the atmosphere is popularly referred to as that
individual’s “carbon footprint.” We owe it to
future humans to take effective steps to reduce
our carbon footprints. One of the most significant
factors affecting our carbon footprint is what we
eat. In fact, what we eat has a bigger impact on our
carbon footprint thanwhatwe drive. The livestock
sector is responsible for 18 % of greenhouse gas
emissions measured in CO2 equivalents [that’s
more than all transportation combined] (FAO
2006, p. xxi). Livestock production accounts for
9 % of anthropogenic CO2 emissions, 37 % of
anthropogenic methane emissions, 65 % of
anthropogenic nitrous oxide emissions, and 64 %
of anthropogenic ammonia emissions (FAO 2006,
p. xxi). By switching to a vegetarian diet, one
reduces one’s carbon footprint by 1.5 tons of
CO2 per year, a greater reduction in CO2 emis-
sions than trading in one’s SUV for a hybrid
vehicle. Given animal agriculture’s sizeable con-
tribution to global warming, our duty to leave
future human generations with a habitable planet
as good as our own provides yet another sound
moral reason to adopt a vegetarian diet.
Conclusion
The case for ethical vegetarianism is overdeter-
mined. When one eats meat, one not only sup-
ports the unnecessary harming, exploiting, and
killing of farmed animals, one also supports an
environmentally destructive and unsustainable
system of agriculture that wastes and/or destroys
vital resources (i.e., water, topsoil, rainforests,
and nutrients), exacerbates global hunger and
the unjust distribution of resources, and contrib-
utes to climate change on a massive scale. Any
one of these reasons – the animal exploitation and
abuse inherent in meat production, meat produc-
tion’s environmental destructiveness and
unsustainability, animal agriculture’s inefficient
use of vital resources, the meat industry’s role in
promoting global food scarcity and worsening an
already unjust distribution of resources, and the
meat industry’s contribution to climate
change – would constitute a good reason for
ethical vegetarianism. Taken collectively, these
reasons provide an overwhelming case for the
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